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BOOK REVIEW
The Hegelian Revival in American
Legal Discourse
HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM: RIGHTS IN CONTEXT. By Steven B. Smith.* Chicago, Illinois; University of Chicago Press. 1991. pp. 251.
Reviewed by David Gray Carlson**
After a century of dormancy, interest among philosophers in
Hegel's work has surged since the 1950's. The reasons for this
renewed interest are well-documented.' Hegel's treatment of binary
oppositions, language, and logic has a startling, modern ring, even
though his chief works date back to the Napoleonic era. Among
other things, Hegel can be credited with developing the methodologies we now associate with deconstruction. Indeed, to the extent
deconstruction has become an important part of modem legal education, it ought to be seen as a wing of the Hegelian revival in American
law schools.2 In addition, Hegel's theory of contract law far surpasses
the mainstream quasi-utilitarian or libertarian theories in its account
of personal autonomy.3 These latter theories of contract rest on prudential arguments-that is, people tend to or ought to prefer to have a
contract law. Hegel, following Kant, would have denounced such
theories as violating the autonomy of the individual because they
founded the need for contract on mere inclination or desire-heteronProfessor of Political Science, Yale University.
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. The
author wishes to thank Ken Casebeer, Richard Hyland, Michel Rosenfeld and Jeanne
Schroeder for reading a draft of this essay.
1. For histories of Hegel's fate since the nineteenth century, see Richard J. Bernstein,
Why Hegel Now, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES 141-175 (1986); HEGEL AND His CRITICS:
PHILOSOPHY IN THE AFTERMATH OF HEGEL (William Desmond ed., 1989); CHARLES
TAYLOR, HEGEL (1975); Richard Hyland, Hegel: A User's Manual, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
1735 (1989). Smith's book, being reviewed here, contains an outstanding history of Hegelian
scholarship.
2. Deconstructionists sometimes dissent from Hegel's totalization. See infra notes 50-52
and accompanying text.
3. Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Concept of
Contract: Hegel and ContemporaryContract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989).
*
**
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omous externalities inconsistent with genuine subjective freedom.4
Hegel's work also powerfully critiques the role of the individual
in the state, in a way that could have profound implications for legal
scholarship, now in a state of severe crisis. A positivist retrenchment
threatens the growth of human rights, while a surge of libertarian
dogmatism threatens to elevate economic rights to a constitutional
dimension. Meanwhile, from the left, the critical legal studies movement denounces legal rights as divisive of a natural communal
solidarity.
In the background of this debate is the controversy over the status of the natural law of liberty. Natural law has become an embarrassment to rights discourse,5 and few scholars today attempt to
ground liberty in nature, assuming instead that such rights exist only
as a matter of positivism. The reason for this position is epistemological. How can you prove these natural rights exist, or what their scope
is? Unfortunately for legal scholarship, the same epistemological
skepticism that has ravaged natural law theory is now at work on
positivism as well, apparently reducing legal discourse to political or
conventional exchanges of no scientific worth.
Hegel's theories have much to contribute to a discourse that has
broken down into a seemingly nihilistic impasse. Hegel thought science could demonstrate the worth of the individual. His philosophy
of right attempted to demonstrate that history necessarily culminates
in freedom, with individuals who enjoy their freedom in unity with
others, joined by a world spirit of which each is a representative. All
of this Hegel claimed to demonstrate with rigor. If correct, his work
is obviously of the utmost importance to modern discourse.
For this reason, Steven Smith's book, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context, could hardly be more timely. In his book,
Smith demonstrates prodigious knowledge not only of Hegel's principal works but also of his other lesser known books and essays. Of
particular value to contemporary legal scholars is that Smith is a very
careful reader of the liberal philosophers, whose influence in American law schools far outweighs that of Hegel. Smith's book is written
to bring home Hegel's importance to persons steeped in official mainstream jurisprudence. As a result, legal scholars unfamiliar with
4. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 32; Benson, supra note 3, at 1099 ("To impose a duty to
perform . . . [w]e must elaborate a form of will that, consistent with autonomy, cannot be
changed as one pleases .... ").
5. Cf. Lawrence H. Tribe, 'NaturalLaw' and the Nominee, N.Y. TiMES, July 15, 1991, at
A15 (denouncing Judge Clarence Thomas for believing in natural law).
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Hegel's work will find Smith's book to be a congenial introduction to
a difficult philosophy.
Hegelians will also find the book intellectually engaging. Smith
offers some exceedingly interesting comments and reactions to Hegel's
formidable system. Smith does not and cannot, in a short book, provide a rigorous deconstruction of Hegel's fantastic claim to have discovered the end of history. Rather, Smith provides the reactions of a
careful scholar with entirely American intuitions to the methodology
Hegel demands for political science. Smith's book is comparable to a
detailed architectural review, a personal reaction to a formidable
edifice.
The book's first chapter, "Why Hegel Today?," expresses some
frustrations with liberal philosophy. Primary among them is the
absence of community from the orthodox liberal account. 6 Smith sees
the liberal self as highly abstract, and not fully integrated into a society in which historical selves must realize their freedom. As a result,
the liberal portrait of personality is "void of moral content. Only by
abstracting from everything we already know about ourselves, our
lives, and our histories will we be in a position to provide a solid and
unimpeachable ground for choosing between moral principles." 7
A chapter entitled "The Origins of the Hegelian Project" then
contrasts Hegel with philosophers who preceded him, starting with
Descartes, whose rationalism is readily accessible to American sensibilities, and proceeding through Montesquieu, Rousseau and Kant.
Smith devotes a great deal of attention throughout the book to
grounding Hegel's methodology in Platonic and Aristotelian thought.
The chapter on Hegel's critique of Hobbes and Locke is especially rewarding for non-Hegelian readers. Particularly useful is
Smith's emphasis on the extent to which these seminal contributors to
middle-of-the-road American liberal philosophy were dedicated to a
natural-law origin of human rights. Thus, "rights are justifiable
claims that belong to individuals as such. Individuals are not
indebted to government or political society for their rights; rather
government has its origins in the rational desires of individuals to protect and defend their preexisting rights as human beings."' Smith
argues that the natural law of Hobbes and Locke is grounded in the
principles of egalitarianism, individualism, voluntarism, reductionism, and universalism. All of this Hegel condemns as "the empirical
6. STEVEN B.

(1991).
7.Id.at 5.
8.Id.at 61.

SMITH,

HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM:

RIGHTS IN CONTEXT

4
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approach," by which he means that "they [Hobbes and Locke]
attempted to derive human rights from certain purportedly natural
needs or desires that all human beings have in the prepolitical state of
nature."9 Smith describes Hegel's critique of natural law theory as
follows:
The problem is that insofar as it aspires to be a theory of
rights at all, empiricism cannot establish what it wants to prove.
For if empiricism wants to be more than just a description of what
rights we happen to enjoy, it must have some way of showing these
rights to be necessary and universal. It must, in other words, have
some way of showing that these rights are rooted in certain permanent features of human nature. But, according to Hegel, this is just
what empiricism is incapable of showing. For categories like
"necessity" and "universality" are not given in experience or discoverable through observation but must be gleaned through other
means. In Hegel's own language, empiricism is incapable of distinguishing between the necessary and the contingent.10
Hegel, who always honors the partial truths that other philosophies
capture, is able to praise this empiricism for emphasizing the centrality of experience in any epistemology. I I But in the end, experience
alone is insufficiently critical of its product. David Lamb very lucidly
demonstrates why this is so. 12 As Hegel tells us, concepts work by
virtue of their limits. That is, if we know something affirmative, we
impliedly know what it is not. Yet, if experience is limited by reference to things that are, then non-being is by definition not
experienced.
If someone claims to have knowledge of an object by virtue of its
properties something should be known about the properties it does
not have. But these properties are not given in the immediacy of
perception and are external to the simple consciousness depicted in
the present phenomenal standpoint. Yet for a percept to possess
determinate properties in its own right it must possess properties
which are not given in passive perception, since only in the posses9. Id. at 64.

10. Id. at 67-68.
11. "For the main lesson of Empiricism is that man must see for himself and feel that he is
present in every facet of knowledge which he has to accept." G.W.F. HEGEL, THE LOGIC OF
HEGEL

§ 38 (William Wallace trans., 2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter

LESSER

LOGIC].

12. See David Lamb, Sense and Meaning in Hegel and Wittgenstein, in HEGEL AND
MODERN PHILOSOPHY 70 (David Lamb ed., 1987); see also G.W.F. HEGEL, THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FICHTE'S AND SCHELLING'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 95 (Walter

Cerf & H.S. Harris eds., 1977) ("Thus [the intellect's] positings and determinings never
accomplish the task; in the very positing and determining that have occurred there lies a
nonpositing and something indeterminate, and hence the task of positing and determining
recurs perpetually.").

1992)

1055

THE HEGELIAN REVIVAL

sion of them can it enjoy
independence. This is the paradox of the
13
Perceiver's standpoint.

Perception, then, pretends to supply the subject with an unmediated
connection to reality, but this pretense is a falsehood. As Smith puts
it: "Hegel's point is that there is an irreducible circularity at the core
of empiricism which does no more than put back into nature what it
took out in the first place."' 4 As a result, "empiricism tends merely to
reinforce existing prejudices."' 15
Against the empiricists Smith juxtaposes the Kantians, who put
forth universalization of principle as the foundation of right.' 6 Here,
Smith covers the familiar critiques of Kant's categorical imperative,
its antihistoricism and lack of content. Drawing on the work of
Hannah Arendt, 7 Smith writes poignantly about how Adolph Eichmann, the director of the holocaust, was able to claim that his actions
were consistent with Kantian moral philosophy."8
Hegel felt that Kantian theory would lead to the cult of the beautiful soul that "lives in dread of staining the radiance of its inner being
by action and existence."' 19 Hegel abhorred this withdrawal from
community life and considered Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) a cornerstone of his own philosophy of right. Rather than accepting the establishment of a negative freedom without content, Hegel's own theory
attempts to establish a positive concept, where the good is proven.
This good is the unity between self and other which can only be
achieved in Sittlichkeit, or "universal self-consciousness." 20 Thus, as
Smith writes, "[fireedom does not imply a world ungoverned by any
regulative principles but a world inhabited by subjects capable of supplying these principles themselves."' 2 1 "The will is not something
13. Lamb, supra note 12, at 88.
14. SMITH, supra note 6, at 68.

15. Id.
16. Kant is also made to stand up against the empiricists on epistemological grounds.
Smith says that Hegel's dialectical method was inherited from Kant, whose "critical
philosophy was a protest against the predominant Enlightenment conception of philosophical
method conceived along the lines of the modem science of nature." SMITH, supra note 6, at
165. That is, for Kant as well as for Hegel, "the mind is not simply a passive transcription of
the world but plays an active part in the structuring of it." Id. at 171. Nevertheless, a great
many pages of the Science of Logic are dedicated to criticizing Kant's metaphysics, often quite
amusingly. G.W.F. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC (H.D. Lewis ed. & A.V. Miller trans., 1969)

[hereinafter
17.

GREATER LOGIC].
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF

EVIL (1963).

18. Id. at 77-78.
19. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 666 (J.B.
[hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY].
20. SMITH, supra note 6, at 121.

21. Id. at 108.

Baillie trans.,

1967)
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prior to its actions. Put another way, a person cannot be totally
detached from the kinds of commitments he has made. The will is
always embedded in real life in an objective world of political and
legal institutions which reach their fruition in the idea of the state."22
This observation relates to Hegel's belief that freedom is realized only
through social means, in Ethical Life where individuals constitute
each other in relations of mutual respect.
In contrast to the Hegelian dialectic of freedom through commitment, the negative freedom of liberal philosophy associates free will
with arbitrariness. That is, freedom means that the will is free to do
anything it chooses. Yet, without some vision of the good-a vision
liberalism is unable to supply-the will is helpless and, rather than
being autonomous, is in fact the total slave of inclination-something
the will has imposed on it externally. 23 To Hegel, this enslavement to
inclination represents the antithesis of freedom.
The unity between self and other, which constitutes freedom for
Hegel, is not simply given to individuals, as negative freedom postulated by liberal philosophers is given to state-of-nature individuals. It
is not, as Smith puts it,
just tautologically posited to make sense of the modern state, but is
historically constructed through a process of labor and struggle.
Unlike a contemporary legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, who
lays down a right to equal concern and respect and then goes on to
describe the kinds of social and political institutions necessary to
sustain that right, Hegel deduces the concept of right from what it
means to be a person.2 4
Personhood is developed, in Hegel's view. It is an achievement of history, not an a priori given. Thus Hegel, along with Nietzsche, is able
to recognize tyranny as a necessary historical development.2 - This
recognition allows Hegel to come to terms with the dark side of our
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 9; see Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Geneology ofMorals, Second Essay, in ON THE
GENEOLOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HoMo 96 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & Walter Kaufman &
R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967). This is not to say that Hegel is nostalgic for these days of
tyranny. As he said in the PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:
The real fact is that the whole law and its every article are based on free
personality alone-on self-determination or autonomy, which is the very
contrary of determination by nature. The law of nature-strictly so called-is
for that reason the predominance of the strong and the reign of force, and a state
of nature a state of violence and wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than
that one ought to depart from it. The social state, on the other hand, is the
condition in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and
sacrificed is just the willfulness and violence of the state of nature.
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history-an embarrassment to liberal philosophers with their hypothetical bargains between equals. 26 Also, because Hegelian personhood is a historical achievement and not a given, it constitutes a
legal, rather than a prelegal, idea. On this view, jurisprudence has a
dynamic relation with selfhood and is not merely the degraded instrument of pregiven individuality.2 7
This is not to say that Hegel believed that history was destined to
progress. I think he would acknowledge that history can retrogress,
that mankind can destroy itself and so impede the progress of Geist.
In fact, when Hegel teaches that personhood is an historical achievement, he means that any given concept in history can be logically
deconstructed into its less adequate antecedents, or logically projected
toward its more adequate forms. Thus, Hegel's famous master-slave
dialectic is not meant to be an historical account of how masters and
slaves interact. Rather, it is a logical argument from the concept of
mastery and slavery, and a projection forward of mutual recognition
28
that these two extreme concepts imply.
Smith seems pessimistic about the effect of Hegel's system on
subjectivity as we experience it:
Hegel sticks to the belief that following a period of estrangement
there will come one of reconciliation and synthesis. This reconciliation with reality he regards as the practical or pedagogical function of philosophy ... But it is not clear, except as a necessity of
logic, why this period of reconciliation is likely to occur at all. At a
practical level, the skeptical shattering of tradition and customs is
more likely to lead to the intensification of feelings of estrangement
and anomie than to lead to the acceptance of fate. Furthermore,
the increase in our powers of self-reflection and autonomy is more
likely to lead to the cultivation of eccentricities and personal peculiarities than to a revivified sense of community. There is arguably
nothing more to connect the first and second negations of this process than mere wishful thinking (emphasis added).2 9
The key here is the emphasized reference to logic. What Hegel says is
G.W.F.

HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, cited in STEVEN
LIBERALISM: RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 125 (1971).

B.

SMITH, HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF

26. Although it is usually overlooked, Rawls has the same appreciation for the fact that a
benevolent democracy is built on the blood spilled by a generation of tyrants. See JOHN
RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 542 (1971). That he mentions this point in a single paragraph
suggests that he views this idea as an embarrassment, something not to be emphasized.
27. Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97
(Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1991).
28. See MICHEL ROSENFELD, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, in HEGEL AND LEGAL
THEORY 228 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1991).
29. SMITH, supra note 6, at 192.
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true of the concept of personhood logically. The effect of logic on
living human beings is not something Hegel ever chose to predict.
Because Hegel thinks personhood is logically or scientifically
generated, it is necessary to view Hegel as another type of natural-law
theorist. Hegel's natural law, however, is different from the one that
liberal philosophers rely on. 30 The Hegelian law of the self is defined
by its dependence on the other and on the sociality of freedom. In
Hegel, the natural law of the individual is dialectical. The individual
is not separate from law but mutually constituted by it. Individuality
in Hegel's system is an achievement, not a presupposition.
For legal scholarship, the meaning of Hegel's natural law of personhood has proved controversial. Thus, Richard Hyland has argued
vigorously that the Philosophyof Right is all form and no content, and
that Hegel's work cannot provide us with practical advice. 3' Kenneth
Casebeer asserts that Hegel spawns a "labor" theory of meaning,
where the work of the individual is to strive toward self-generated
meaning, rather than succumbing to an unmediated, alien meaning.
Without such work, Casebeer implies, Hegel cannot supply a practical
program for overcoming the subject-object distinction that Casebeer
sees as the worker's fundamental obstacle.32 This interpretation too
stops short of deriving a meaning from Hegel's system, other than the
general need to strive for meaning.
In contrast, Drucilla Cornell takes the natural law of the person
as a basis for practical legal change-for example, the repeal of the
employment-at-will doctrine of labor law. But in doing so, she must
make use of the ends-means prudential reasoning which is distinctly
non-Hegelian.3 3 Cornell explains her break with Hegel:
Of course, if we break with Hegel's system in the name of an inevitable indeterminacy, we can no longer argue that there is a
dynamic telos which inevitably leads to the actualization of dialogic reciprocity in the modem democratic state. Instead, we must
30. Smith refers to this as a "crypto-state-of-nature" theory. See supra note 6, at 115.
31. Hyland, supra note 1, at 1741.
32. Kenneth Casebeer, Work on a Labor Theory of Meaning, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1637,
1664 (1989); see also Jiirgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of
Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 38, 53 (1989):
What moral theory can do and should be trusted to do is clarify the universal
core of our moral intuitions, thereby refuting value skepticism. What it cannot
do is make any kind of substantive contribution. By singling out a procedure of
decisionmaking, it seeks to make room for those involved, who must then, under
their own steam, find answers to the moral-practical issues that come at them
.... Moral philosophy does not have privileged access to particular moral truths.
33. Drucilla Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique of Employment at Will, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 1575 (1989).
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rely on rational commitment to this ideal, because it allows us to
synchronize most effectively two of our deepest political and legal
ideals, freedom and equality. Of course, this synchronization is not
perfect. But this inevitable imperfection does not mean that we
cannot argue for its relative success in comparison with competing
principles... 34
At the level of such prudential advice, the argumentative progression
in Cornell's critique of employment-at-will is not necessarily logical,
but depends on a constant progress of essentialized meanings attributed to legal programs. Therefore, Cornell's argument for a "reasonable cause" rule in lieu of employment-at-will is open to counteressentializations, making the issue, in the end, formally undecidable.
Cornell can isolate a particular feature of her favored legislative program which seems to conform to Hegel's natural law of the person.
However, Richard Posner" and Jonathan Macey 36 can isolate some
other particular of their employment-at-will program from a utilitarian or libertarian perspective, which also conforms to Hegel's concept. Who wins this argument is a matter of intuition. Or, to say the
same thing differently, this mode of decision is necessarily outside of
Hegel's logic. 37 This is by no means a criticism of Cornell's project;
rather, it is a recognition of what it means to draw regulative ideals
from Hegel's system-a major theme in Cornell's work.
Smith seems to agree with the Casebeer-Hyland view that Hegel
cannot be translated into a determinate program of political action:
The accusation that Hegel merely rationalizes, and hence legitimates certain contingent historical institutions, thus conferring a
purportedly timeless validity on them, is a more difficult charge to
answer .... The idea of working out some "ideal theory," such as
Marx's notion of "true democracy" or "human emancipation,"
and then using this theory as a criterion for judging existing insti34. Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalizationof Meaning, Recollective Imagination,and the
Potentialfor Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1222 (1988).
35. Richard A. Posner, Hegel and Employment at Will: A Comment, 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1625 (1989).
36. Jonathan R. Macey, Firm-Specific Human CapitalInvestments and Hegelian Ethics: A
Comment on Cornell and Posner, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 505 (1990).
37. Commenting on this style of argument, Hegel writes:
[T]he Idea is the unity of the Notion and objectivity... it must not be regarded
merely as a goal to which we have to approximate but which itself always

remains a kind of beyond; on the contrary, we must recognize that everything is
actual is only in so far as it possesses the Idea and expresses it. It is not merely
that the object, the objective and subjective world in general, ought to be
congruous with the Idea, but they are themselves the congruence of Notion and
reality; the reality that does not correspond to the notion is mere Appearance, the
subjective, contingent, capricious element that is not the truth.
GREATER LoGic, supra note 16, at 756.
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tutions and as a norm for future society is entirely foreign to
Hegel's approach. Instead, he attempts to bring out the rationality
that is already there within existing institutions and forms of life,
including the monarchy.3"
But Smith does defend Hegel from the critique that he can have no
impact on politics whatsoever:
Hegel did not believe that the philosophical or conceptual understanding of reality leaves it untouched. Reality is changed by being
apprehended [because] reality is in part made up of our interpretations, so that to change our interpretations of the world is to
change the world.3 9

Similarly: "The Hegelian state is not neutral vis-a-vis its citizens. Its
goal is the positive one of promoting a form of Sittlichkeit in which all
citizens can share;" but "[rlather than offer an ethical program in
terms of rules and principles, Hegel is concerned to offer a theory of
ethical relations. These relations precede the will and provide it with
a determinate content and focus."'
Whatever intrusions Hegel's theory of the person makes upon
policy arguments, the thing that alienates most modern philosophers
about Hegel is his claim to have discovered the one true total system
into which everything else fits.4 Today we are trained to doubt such
totalities and Smith is among the skeptics. He views Hegel's totalization as "an embarrassing weakness," though "it remains possible to
salvage his useful political insights from their speculative wrapping."' 42 Indeed, Smith claims that "Hegel's demand for metaphysical
closure remains an obstacle to the fuller realization of liberal ends and
43
purposes.
Smith's critique certainly fits in with the modern prejudice about
totalities. Indeed, the very word "totality" recalls twentieth century
fascism or communism, both of which are commonly laid at Hegel's
doorstep.' These charges have been amply refuted, though, most
38. SMITH, supra note 6, at 156.

39. Id. at 192-93.
40. Id. at 130.
41. Drucilla Cornell writes:
Hegel's closed circle of the Absolute is also a prison for the individual, because
there can be no transcendence of the system. The system establishes an order
from which no one can keep his distance; nothing henceforth is exterior.
Ontology enforces the status quo in the name of a tired, cynical realism: "This is
all there is."
Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The PromiseofRedemption and the Possibility of Legal
Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1693-94 (1990).
42. SMITH, supra note 6, at 134.

43. Id. at 233.
44. The most notorious attempt to do so is KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS

19921

THE HEGELIAN REVIVAL

1061

recently in Smith's fifth chapter: "The Hegelian Rechtsstaat." 4' ' 5
In fact, Hegel's totality seems rather benign, a system at such a

high level of abstraction that its application to microproblems is quite
impossible. Hegel's totality seems to have about as much of a relationship to fascism as does the astronomical concept of "the uni-

verse," which has so far proved large enough a concept to encompass
a very free notion of subjectivity.
In Hegel's defense, it should moreover be pointed out that his
master epistemological work, the Greater Logic, covers 844 pages in
English translation. The work carefully moves through the stages of6
quality, quantity, measure (the conjunction of the prior two),
essence (in which the negativity of determinate being is purged), subjectivity, objectivity and the Idea. The notorious closure of Hegel's
totality occurs only in the very last twenty pages. Until that point,
the system is rife with contradiction and movement.
The usual critique of Hegel's totality is that it is a thought or a
concept, like any other philosophical theory; and, being a concept, it
implies its negativity. That is, the concept implies a limit, though'something beyond-in which case it is hardly a totality.4 7 Hence the
totality contradicts itself. Indeed, in the Greater Logic, Hegel
denounces concepts that purport to be infinite-false totalities-and
uses this very argument to discredit such claims.48
(1963). For a scathing treatment of Popper's
attempt to defame Hegel, see Walter Kaufmann, The Hegel Myth and Its Method, in HEGEL:
A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 21 (A. MacIntyre ed., 1972). Hegel's own response to
such claims of violence is that violence does not occur when objects are treated according to
their own nature. Hegel perceived himself as letting objectivity speak for itself, within the
ENEMIES: THE HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY 27-80

larger context of Spirit. GREATER LOGIC, supra note 16, at 720, 746.

45. Of these charges, Smith says:
Hegel's own preferences for constitutional government and his support for the
liberalizing reform movements of Hardenberg and von Stein have, arguably,
more in common with the ideas of such figures as Locke, Montesquieu, and Kant
than with those of the enemies of liberalism on both the left and the right.
SMITH, supra note 6, at 132.

46. Together, these three stages comprise the realm of being, that is, the realm of non-selfsubsistent dependence on the other.
47. Drucilla Cornell, Post-Structuralism,the Ethical Relation, and the Law, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1587, 1594-96 (1988) (describing the views of Emanuel Levinas and Martin Heidegger).
48. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 240. Hegel writes: "The infinite is... being which has
restored itself out of limitedness. The infinite is, and more intensely so than the first immediate
being; it is the true being, the elevation above limitation." GREATER LOGIC, supra note 16, at
137. Hegel is being sarcastic here; the infinity in question is rife with contradiction:
Since both the finite and the infinite itself are moments of the progress they are
jointly or in common thefinite, and since they are equally together negated in it
and in the result, this result as negation of the finitude of both is called with truth
the infinite. Their difference is thus the double meaning which both have. The
finite has the double meaning of being first, only the finite over against the infinite
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Yet Hegel claimed his total system was immune from these
deconstructive critiques which he himself exquisitely developed early
in the Logic. The modern assumption that Hegel's totality is false
may thus be right, but until it is proven that Hegel's totality is based
on logical errors, the assumption is nothing but an unsubstantiated
prejudice.
Hegel is entitled to insist that his system be defeated through a
demonstration of its weakness. Whether or not it ultimately can be
vindicated is uncertain. 9 Hegel, meanwhile, has proven a fecund
critic of other philosophies, and even critics like Smith recommend
that "rather than condemn Hegel to the dustbin of history, it remains
possible to salvage his useful political insights from their speculative
wrapping."' 50 Smith's book, which focuses on Hegel's political and
legal theories, is a welcome addition to the Hegelian renaissance in
legal academics.
APPENDIX

This appendix attempts to set forth how Hegel's totality achieves
an immunity from his own critique of determinate being. If this
immunity can be shown, the postmodern critique of Hegel fails.
This demonstration is best made by reference to Hegel's doctrine
of essence. Now essence is only the halfway mark-the end of the
Objective Logic. But in essence are the seeds of the concepts that
make Hegel's totality possible.
To grasp how essence works, we will need a lightning tour
through the early chapters of the Logic. Hegel starts (arbitrarily, as
he admits) with being, a category chosen on the assumption that every
thing has it. 5 In its purity, being is without determination, and it
ends up as pure nothing. Yet this identity of pure being and nothing
which stands opposed to it, and secondly, of being the finite and at the same time
the infinite opposed to it. The infinite, too, has the double meaning of being one
of these two moments-as such it is the spurious infinite-and also the infinite in
which both, the infinite and its other, are only moments. The infinite, therefore
• . . is . . . the process in which it is deposed to being only one of its
determinations, the opposite of the finite ... and then raising ... itself into the

affirmation of itself and through this mediation becoming the true infinite.
Id. at 148.
49. In the Appendix, infra, I briefly describe Hegel's totalizing move and how it purports
to be immune from the criticism just presented.
50. SMITH, supra note 6, at 134.
51. GreaterLogic commences with an amusing essay, "With What Must Science Begin?"
In this essay, Hegel admits that "here at the start ....
philosophy is ... some assumed,
unjustified conception." GREATER LoGIc, supra note 16, at 72-73; see also id. at 827. But the

entire system will eventually vindicate his choice of a beginning-pure being and pure nothing.
Id. at 827-31.
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constitutes a modulation-a movement that is becoming. This movement, a "third" in violation of the rule of the excluded middle,
introduces determinacy and so constitutes a determinate being separate from pure being and nothing. Hence, determinate being is born.
A determinate being implies a limit, and a negative Other beyond that
limit. This relation of determinate being to negativity Hegel calls
quality.
In order to have integrity as a being, the determinate being tries
to deny it is constituted by the Other. It tries to characterize the
Other as a separate determinate being. This "being-for-self" is expropriated for itself, but it is also awarded to the Other.52 Hence, we
have the idea of multiplicity growing out of pure quality. Quality has
become quantity.
Pure quantity represents the identity of being-for-self and beingfor-other. As such, it is indifferent to quality. But quantity tries to be
the same limitless concept that pure being tried to be, with the same
result. Determinateness is necessarily introduced to distinguish quantity and quality. (This occurs because pure quantity, indifferent to
being, implies infinite multiples of beings. Yet, this continuous string
also implies a qualitative difference between the beings). This new
determinate quantity is quantum.
Because quantum implies both discreteness and continuity, the
single unit in the continuum is number. Number consists of an
amount of units. Thus, fifteen is really fifteen ones (or perhaps three
units of five or one group-of-fifteen). Number, then, is always a ratio,
or a relation between two quanta.
At first, a ratio is a direct ratio-an indeterminate relation
between unit and amount. But such a ratio is a relation between two
indeterminate quanta (15 = a x b). These indeterminate quanta must
resolve into determinate quanta, but can only do so with external
assistance. Thus, externally we can assert a = 3 to find that b = 5.

But there is a limit to this external manipulation of the sides of
the ratio. For instance, the unit might be lowered to an amount infinitesimally approaching zero, in which case the amount becomes infi52. Late in GreaterLogic, Hegel writes:
the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the
usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the
immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated-contains in general the
determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially
preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its
negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most
important feature in rational cognition ....
GREATER LoGic, supra note 16, at 834.
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nitely large, but the unit cannot become zero without destroying the
ratio altogether. Hence, the ratio has a self-subsistence against external manipulation.
This self-subsistence implies a more perfect, self-reliant form,
known as the ratio of powers. The ratio of powers is the equality of
unit and amount (a x a = 15) and a provisional being-for-self. This
return of quality into quantity constitutes measure.
Since quanta turn out to be qualities, and since the ratio is made
up of quanta each of which has being-for-self, measure is a relation
between two qualities (a relation between a and a, where a x a = 15).
This ratio has being-for-self (which will be the hallmark of essence)
but the sides of the ratio are still related numerically to each other.
"[T]heir self-subsistence also rests essentially on quantitative relation
and quantitative difference; and so their self-subsistence becomes a
transition of each into the other, with the result that measure perishes
in the measureless.' '53 This measurelessness represents indifference to
external manipulation of quanta. The unity of quality and quantity
become genuinely self-reliant-indifferent to the Other that is the
hallmark of being-and hence the unity passes over into essence. In
other words, essence is the negation of the being that is constituted by
its Other.
Essence is the stage in which the determinate being's self-destructiveness is first contained. Here we have a glimpse of Hegel's totalizing move, the point after which Hegel himself feels immune from
the standard critique of his totalization.
First, essence is the negation of being, and hence stands opposed
to it. The two-essence and being-are equal. At this point, essence
is not yet essence but merely the essential, which has equal dignity to
"unessential" being. As such, these opposites are in the realm of
determinate being and are maintained only by virtue of an external
constitution. But being has been negated already. It is repulsed
being-for-self. As the negation of essence, being is "in andfor itself a
nullity."' 54 That is, it is non-essence or illusory being.
Illusory being, then, stands over against essence, but, says Hegel,
it is not necessary to show that illusory being withdraws into essence.
Being in its totality has already done so, in negative form. 55 It is only
53. Id. at 330.
54. Id. at 395.
55. Id. at 397. That is, being self-destructed into quantity, measure, etc., and is now in
essence, even while it was negated by essence. This simultaneous destruction-and-preservation
is what Hegel called Aufhebung-often translated as sublation. See id. at 107 ("What is
sublated is not.., reduced to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated... is the result
of mediation; it is a non-being ...

which had its origin in a being.").
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56
necessary that illusory being's determinations come from essence. If
so, then essence is immune from the critique of determinate being.
This is derived as follows: Essence is the non-being of being. But
the "indifference which this non-being contains is essence's own absolute being-in-itself. The negativity of essence is its equality with itself
or its simple immediacy and indifference.""15 Being has thus preserved
itself in essence, and "[t]he immediacy of the determinateness in illusory being over against essence is consequently nothing other than
essence's own immediacy.""8 The determinations upon which illusory
being is founded thus come from within essence. From now on,
essence is immune from the critique that it expels its own negativity,
thereby creating a competing being. That is, to be self-contained,
essence must sublate the determinateness which is the disease of
determinate being. This is accomplished if illusory being's determinations are shown to be inside essence. Such containment is termed
movement. And when essence moves, it is reflection. 9
Now, since essence is the negation of being and illusory being is
the negation of essence, and since illusory being's determinations (i.e.,
negations) come from essence, essence negates itself. Essence "consists, therefore, in being itself and not itself and that, too, in a single
unity."'6 As the unity between itself and not itself, essence is immune
from the critique of being. Essence no longer necessarily implies its
Other-in the sense of an Other that is radically exterior. Determinate being is now contained.
This is not to say that essence is the totality. So far we are only
half way through the Logic. Rather, we have seen only that essence
has movement within it and does not go forth from itself; and hence
this movement of necessity returns to itself. Hegel calls this movement "reflective." At this point, "there is no other on hand, either an
other from which or into which immediacy returns; it is, therefore,
61
only as a returning movement, or as the negative of itself."
Essences now "appear as free essentialities floating in the void
without attracting or repelling one another."' 62 Essences are obviously

56. Id. at 397.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. As Rodolphe Gasch6 reminds us, the etymology of "reflection"-from the Latin
reflectere, means both "to bend" or "to turn back" and "to bring back." RODOLPHE GASCHIE,
THE TAIN OF THE MIRROR: DERRIDA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF REFLECTION

16 (1986)

(emphasis added). The "bringing back" aspect of reflection is the key to essence's selfsubsistence.
60. GREATER LOGIC, supra note 16, at 400.

61. Id. at 401.
62. Id. at 407.
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not the whole system. Indeed, their immunity from the decay that
awaits determinate being "does not exempt them from transition and
contradiction. ' 63 Because essence is both equality-with-self and difference-with-self, essence modulates between these two extremes until
it becomes ground-the return of reflection to itself after it negates
itself. Essence is the identity of identity and difference. 64 But essence
can be viewed as a kind of sub-system which illustrates how determinate being can be contained. Thus, Hegel frequently refers to essences
65
as "totalities.

Alan Brudner writes persuasively in defense of Hegel's totality
against the claim that the totality implies its negation:
To assert the claims of the other against ...

a totality that has

made room for the rebellion of difference is to assert once again the
fixity or absoluteness of the other and so to deny it as difference.
In this way, the radicalization of protest through the abstraction of
the negative turns round into its opposite, for it is now indistinguishable from the complacent self-regard of the isolated individual. The one-sided fidelity to death turns into its denial.66
That is, those who insist on dragging the totality back into the sphere
of being, where otherness defines it, are guilty ot privileging the
other-of not attending to Hegel's claim to have contained the other
within essence and all the other advanced forms of individuality.67
Rodolphe Gasche, in his masterful study of reflection, concurs:
Any attempt to challenge absolute reflection through some notion
of immediacy is bound to fail.... [It] disregards the fact that such

a reflection, which starts with something alien to it, is what Hegel
called external reflection, and thus one moment in the dialectics of
63. Id. at 411.
64. Hence, Hegel's attack on the proposition A = A. Id. at 413 ("[i]dentity... in its very
nature is ...

to be different.").

65. Id. at 474-75, 486, 504, 506-07, 509, 511-12, 527. Interestingly, when essence has
finally completed its development-all the while self-subsistent and self-contained-subjectivity
emerges. This is the standard liberal selfhood that most liberal philosophers take for granted.
Yet Hegel has literally produced itfrom pure nothing. Id. at 577-83. See GASCHf, supra note
58, at 62 ("Hegel's critique of reflection, and his intensification of it to absolute reflection by
elevating the major these of reflection to the level of the Concept or Notion, represents a
radical completion of subjectivity, freedom, autonomy, self-certitude and certitude,
transcendentality, and so on.").
66. Alan Brudner, The Ideality of Difference: Toward Objectivity in Legal Interpretation,
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1195 (1990).
67. See Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict,
Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211,
1218-19 & n. 24 (1990) ("Turning the tables on Derrida, one could characterize his
deconstructive enterprise in Hegelian terms, as an ontological privileging of difference which
makes it irreducibly transcendent thus preventing its sublation . . . within a totality
encompassing both self and other.").
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reflection, which develops into absolute reflection where that dualism is superseded.68
Gasch6's project is to portray Jacques Derrida as not criticizing
Hegel's totality from the vantage point of determine being. Gasch6
tries to explain Derrida's critique of Hegel rather as one that recognizes a totality, but a totality that is "heterogeneous" and honors but
does not privilege difference.6 9 So portrayed, postmodern thought is
shown as recognizing "the logical superiority of speculative thought
over all attempts to criticize it in a reflexive mode from a position
erroneously considered to be outside it." 7 °

68. GASCHP,, supra note 58, at 74 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. c. 6. Thus Gasch6 remarks
Derrida's Other ... is an alterity that has nothing of an essence or truth. Instead
of being one essential alterity, it is irretrievably plural and cannot be assimilated,
digested, represented, or thought as such, and hence put to work by the system of
metaphysics .... Derrida's Otherness is, consequently, neither a lack.., nor the
still meaningful reverse side of the positivity of the Hegelian Concept or Notion.
The Otherness of unconditional heterology is more and less than negativity.
Id. at 103.
70. Id. at 79.

